The International Military Tribunals: An Overview and Assessment by Franklin, Joshua Daniel
Ouachita Baptist University
Scholarly Commons @ Ouachita
Honors Theses Carl Goodson Honors Program
2001
The International Military Tribunals: An Overview
and Assessment
Joshua Daniel Franklin
Ouachita Baptist University
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.obu.edu/honors_theses
Part of the Military History Commons
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Carl Goodson Honors Program at Scholarly Commons @ Ouachita. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Honors Theses by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons @ Ouachita. For more information, please contact
mortensona@obu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Franklin, Joshua Daniel, "The International Military Tribunals: An Overview and Assessment" (2001). Honors Theses. 108.
https://scholarlycommons.obu.edu/honors_theses/108

Contents 
Background 
Prosecuted German Atrocities 
Prosecuted Japanese Atrocities 
Development of the Trial Plan . 
The International Conference on \1ilitary Trials 
The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg 
The Court and Defendants . 
Proceedings 
Judgment . 
The International Military Tribunal for the Far East 
The Court and Defendants . 
Proceedings 
Judgment 
Assessment 
Comparing the International Military Tribunals 
Similarities 
Differences . 
Post-Trial Variances 
Conclusion 
Bibliography 
2 
4 
5 
7 
10 
13 
14 
16 
20 
21 
24 
28 
30 
31 
32 
33 
35 
40 
41 
45 
As World \Var II drew to a close in Europe, the victorious Allies faced the question 
of v,:hat to do with the political and military leaders of defeated Germany. The war had 
been like none other; they needed a drastically new approach to the final treatment of those 
in charge of the Axis powers. \t\Thile war crimes could be punished under the Geneva and 
Hague Conventions, no international agreements assigned personal responsibility to those 
who ordered the crimes. 
While Axis leaders could have been simply executed, the Allies chose to plan a cooper-
ative international trial. The resulting International :\1ilitary Tribunal (IMT)-commonly 
known as the Kuremberg trial-was a carefully planned, well-funded and adequately staffed 
experiment in international law that is often cited today. Before the Nuremberg trial ended, 
a similar effort began in the Far East for Japanese leaders, but it had less support and has 
been the subject of far less historical analysis. 
Why is the Nuremberg trial often considered a watershed event while its Tokyo counter-
part is at best a legal footnote? After more than a half-century of criticism, it is obvious that 
a major war crimes trial for national leaders, though preferable to summary execution, was 
more suited to the situation in Germany than in Japan. The Allies developed t he London 
Charter that governed the IMT to try German leaders for more than just conventional war 
crimes, and the ~uremberg trial was tied to those circumstances. vVhile many Japanese 
leaders were guilty of war crimes, the situation might have been more eil'ectively dealL with 
by separate courts-martial. In other words, the complexities of the Asian situation revealed 
the IMT frame·work's limitations. 
Both Allied goals and the geopolitical context help explain the Japanese trial's relative 
lack of importance. At Nuremberg, t he Allies were still attempting to establish a frame-
work for international judicial cooperation and to discredit Nazism in Germany. The Tokyo 
trial lacked the same sense of urgency and purpose. K uremberg had already set the le-
gal precedent, time's progression had revealed a vVestern-Soviet rift, and the uS-dominated 
occupation of Japan found oLher ways to meet democratization goals. 
2 
Background 
It is a testimony to the influence of the International Military Tribunal (IMT) that today 
wartime atrocities are often, if not usua1ly, defined with terminology first used for the trial. 1 
The Nuremberg trial followed the rules and procedures set out in the London Charter, which 
was a product of the International Conference on Military Trials (ICMT). Article 6 of this 
document defines prosecutable crimes: 
The following acts, or any of them, are crimes coming within the jurisdiction 
of the Tribunal for which there shall be individual responsibility: 
(a) CRJMES AGAINST PEACE: namely, planning, preparation, initiation, or 
waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, 
agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for 
the accomplishment of any of the foregoing; 
{b) WAR CRJMES: namely, violations of the laws or customs of war. Such vio-
lations shall incfude, but not be limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation 
to slave labor or for any purpose of civilian population of or in occupied terri-
tory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing 
of hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, 
towns, or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity; 
(c) CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: namely, murder, exterminaLion, enslave-
ment, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian pop-
ulation, before or during the war or persecution on political, racial or religious 
grounds in execution or in connection with any crimes within the jurisdiction of 
the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of domestic law of the country where 
perpetrated. 2 
The United Nations, as the Allies then called themselves, argued in 1945 that each of 
these definitions was justified by established international law: 6(a) under the controversial 
Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, 6(b) under the Hague and Geneva Conventions of 1907 and 
1929 respectively, and 6(c) under an international form of common law. 
The Crimes Against Peace charge, based as it was on the Kellogg-Briand Pact, had a 
shaky legal foundation that was challenged before and during the trials. In fact, only the War 
Crimes charge was firmly established in international law. Since the defendants accepted the 
1In this paper, war crime denotes violations of Lhe Hague and/ or Geneva Conventions, while atrocities 
denotes violations in general. 
2 Charter of the International Military Tribunal. Available 20 Scp 2000 
< http:/ jwww.yale.eduj lawwebjavalon/ imt/ procj imtconst.htm> . 
3 
immorality of actions such as mass murder or slave labor, no one was likely to challenge the 
Crimes Against Humanity charge even though it had the least formal basis in international 
law. 
One shortcoming of the Kellogg-Briand Pact is that it expressly allowed wars of self-
defense, but defined neither that term nor "war of aggression"- an omission which the 
Japanese defendants at the Tokyo trial attempted to use to their advantage. Also, since 
the Pact took the form of a contract, some argued that violation invited compensational, 
not criminal, penalties. 3 Several authorities on international law even held that violation of 
the Pact merely forfeited the rights to its benefits- for example, after Italy invaded Abyssinia 
(Ethiopia) in 1935, other Pact signatories could then attack Italy in a "war of aggression."4 
~egative opinions of the Kellogg-Briand Pact, and the Crimes Against Peace charge, 
. 
originated with the belief that international law is based on formal agreements, not just 
precedent. For example, Professor Andre Gras, one of the two French representatives to 
the ICMT in London, stated, "Y.le think !personal responsibility for starting warsj would be 
morally and politically desirable, but that it is not international law."5 Many legal scholars 
withheld support pending an international agreement that would add specific criminal penal-
ties to the Kellogg-Briand Pact. An opposing view of international law, especially in the 
United States, judged international law to be akin to Anglo-American common law; formal 
international agreements were helpful, but not required for a criminal charge. Based on this 
view, Article 6(a), Crimes Against Peace, was included in the London Charter. 
The Allies also designed the Charter as a response to postwar public opinion; it applied 
specifically to publicized Nazi outrages, such as the extermination camps in Poland, to 
which Allied leaders had not directly responded during the war. A Crime Against Peace, the 
invasion of Poland "in violation of international treaties," began the war. \.Var Crimes, such 
3 Bradley F. Smith, The Road to Nuremberg (New York: Basic Books, 1981) , 104. 
4 Some authorities are listed in Smith, Road, 106, along with Colonel William Chanler's au.acks on them 
as having "built up [their view of international law] largely on their own and their predecessors' writings." 
5Document XXXVII:"Minutes July 19, 1945" in Robert H. Jackson, Report of Robert H. Jackson, United 
States Representative to the International Conference on Military Trials, London, 1945. (Washington, DC: 
United States Government Printing Office, 1947), 297. 
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as the massacre of Allied prisoners of war and civilians at Malmedy, Belgium, in December 
1944, were still fresh in the public's mind, and the world press was still discussing the Crimes 
Against Humanity committed in the concentration and death camps. 
Neither International Military Tribunal was designed to cover all wartime atrocities. Of-
ficial Allied policy, established by the Moscow Declaration of November 1943, designated 
major and minor classes of war criminals. The London Charter targeted the "[m]ajor crim-
inals whose offenses have no particular geographical location." The International Military 
Tribunals meant to punish the highest authorities who planned aggressive war, ordered or 
encouraged conventional war crimes, and orchestrated gross violations of human rights. Ju-
nior officers and enlisted soldiers- who perpetrated the vast majority of conventional war 
crimes- made up the other category. They were to be "sent back to the countries in which 
. 
their abominable deeds were done in order that they may be judged and punished."6 These 
many s·mall trials were beyond the scope of the Nuremberg trial, or the later Tokyo triaP 
Prosecuted German Atrocities 
The major criminals were charged with Crimes Against Peace throughout Europe. Ger-
many violated treaties with, or the neutrality of, a long list of countries during Lhe war: 
Czechoslovakia (March 1939), Poland (September 1939), Denmark and Norway {April1940), 
Belgium and the Netherlands {May 1940) , Yugoslavia and Greece (April 1941), the Soviet 
Union (June 1941), the United States {December 1941), and Italy (May 1943). France and 
the United Kingdom, though Allied Powers, are not included on the list as both declared 
war on Germany after the invasion of Poland. 
The war crimes violations were not physical murders, but orders to commit, murder. 
German practice had been very different in Western and Eastern Europe. In the West, three 
6Winston Churchill, Franklin Roosevelt, and Joseph Stalin, "The Moscow Declaration" in Michael ~arrus , 
ed., The Nuremberg War Crimes Trial, 1945-46: A Documentary History (::\ew York: Bedford Books, 1997), 
21. 
7 Smaller trials later held at Nuremberg under Control Council Law Number Ten are sometimes called 
the Nuremberg trials, but the term International Military Tribunal refers only to the first Nuremberg trial. 
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issues formed the focus: unrestricted submarine warfare, the Commando Order,8 and slave 
labor deportations. The Germans had treated Western European civilians and prisoners of 
war (POWs) relatively well compared to those in the East. There, German conduct reflected 
Slavs' low place in the Nazi racial hierarchy- Polish civilians and soldiers were massacred 
and Soviet POWs were allowed to starve or freeze. Only 18% of Soviet POWs taken by the 
Germans survived, compared with 76% of British and American POWs. 9 At Nuremberg, 
Nazi leaders were prosecuted for the directives that caused these war crimes. 
To the layman, the Crimes Against Humanity charge defined in Article 6(c) of thr Lon-
don Charter seems to be a forerunner to the charge of genocide and to apply mainly to the 
Holocaust. Since much of the Holocaust was covered under War Crimes, Crimes Against 
Humanity actually had a much wider scope. The Crimes Against Humanity charge was 
. 
designed to cover all Nazi war crime-like behavior that fell outside formal war crimes def-
initions, such as Nazi anti-Jewish laws, placement of German dissidents in concentration 
camps, and the deportation of Western European Jews. 10 
Prosecuted Japanese Atrocities 
Led by its Imperial Army, Japan had also broken treaties with a string of countries, 
beginning with the 1931 takeover of Manchuria, a warlord-controlled Chinese region. In 1937, 
a full-scale invasion of the rest of China, known as the China Incident, followed. Around 
the same time, Soviet and Japanese troops fought two border incidents in Manchuria and 
Mongolia. Although they took place outside Soviet territory, in the Indictment these two 
episodes were included as instances of aggressive warfare against the USSR. finally, in late 
1941 came the attacks on British, United States, and Portuguese territories that started the 
8 The Commando Order, issued from the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW, or High Command of 
the Armed Forces) 18 October 1942, stated that all captured Allied commandos (usually raiding forces) or 
parachutists were to be turned in as criminals to t.he Sicherheitsdienst (SD, or Security Service) and usually 
executed, instead of being given prisoner-of-war status. 
9 Terence Pritie, The Velvet Chancellors: A History of Post-War Germany (London: Frederick Muller 
Limited, 1979), 24. 
10International Military 'Iribunal at Nuremberg, ''Indictment of the International Military Tribunal Against 
Hermann Goring et al." Available 20 Sep 2000 
< http:/ j www.yale.edu/ lawwebj avalon/ imtjprocj counL.htm> . 
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Pacific War. The outbreak of war also induced the French government of Indo-China and 
Siamese (Thai) authorities to accept Japanese demands without a fight , and the Dutch to 
declare war on Japan before their East Indies colony was attacked. 
War crimes were a more complicated matter, since neither Japan nor the USSR were 
signatories of the Geneva Convention of 1929- though in 1942 communiques J apancse leaders 
agreed to observe all Geneva guidelines. The prosecution dealt with this problem by indicting 
the accused for a "plan or conspiracy ... to order, authorise !sic] and permit ... breaches of 
the Laws and Customs of War'' or because they "deliberately and recklessly disregarded their 
legal duty to take adequate steps to secure the observance and prevent breaches [of the Laws 
of War]."11 
A few war crimes committed by Japanese forces, such as the Rape of Nanking and the 
Bataan Death March, \vere well known. Also, only around 72% of British and United States 
POWs survived Japanese custody compared with 96% in the German caseP Although 
tropical diseases and life partially account for the higher death rate in Asia, Japanese camps 
certainly did not follow Geneva guidelines. The Japanese used both Allied POWs and local 
peoples as slave labor; ironically for a nation claiming to fight for the liberation of Asia, 
Asians fared much worse than European colonials under Japanese occupation. The Tokyo 
prosecution only of violations against citizens of the Western Powers and China excluded the 
majority of these crimes-which could have been covered under Crimes Against Humanity. 
Unlike the German case, specific orders to Japanese units to commit atrocities do not 
exist.13 The prosecution case for Crimes Against Humanity thus was based largely on the 
failure of the accused to properly restrain lower officers- or even those in other branches of 
government. This dubious application of the military principle of command responsibility 
to international law remains controversial, as does whether or not Japanese leaders were 
11
''lndictment" in Department of State, Trial of the Japanese War Criminals (Washington: United States 
Government Printing Office, 1945), 612. 
12John Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War· II {l'iew York: New Press, 1999), 446. 
13Dower, Embracing Defeat, 466. There may have been orders among the documents destroyed during the 
two weeks between the Japanese surrender and the first landings of Allied occupation personnel. 
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responsible. 
Development of the Trial Plan 
The Moscow Declaration made no mention of trials to estab1ish the guilt of those accused 
of wartime atrocities. This omission was partly motivated by the hope that lack of detail 
would encourage German authorities to adhere to the laws of war more closely. Speci fi c 
punishments, on the other hand, might communicate to capital offenders- such as the high 
command- that the cause was already lost, which might lead to reprisals such as razing 
occupied territory or slaughtering all prisoners. 14 
The Big Three- Prime Minister Winston Churchill of the United Kingdom, President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt of the United States, and Marshall Josef Stalin of t he Soviet Union-
who issued the Moscow Declaration, made all the major Allied executive decisions during 
the war. Their decisions were the final ones, and it is clear that the Big Three did not 
assume capital offenders would be tried in a trial. Stalin first proposed the idea of a trial 
to Churchill and Roosevelt, although with Soviet show trials of t he 1930s as a background 
this hardly meant impartial justice. At Tehran in November 1943, Stalin suggested to 
Churchill, possibly to irk him, that trials might result in the execution of 50,000 German 
officers. Anglo-American leaders understandably preferred a different approach; Churchill 
in particular was worried about ex post .facto additions to international law. 15 Churchill's 
answer to the problem was summary execution of Nazi leaders, a list of whom would be 
made up by the Allies. As precedent, he cited the British exile of Napoleon to St. Helena 
without a trial.16 
Besides being attractively simple, this plan had the support of key officials in the US and 
British governments. Secretary of t he Treasury Henry Morgenthau's department developed 
a comprehensive occupation plan for Germany, known as the Morgenthau Plan. A harsh 
14Smith, Road, 9. 
ll>Smith, Road, 271 n. 45. Churchill's ex post facto worries dealt with aggressive war in particular and 
were, as discussed earlier, well-founded. 
16Telford Taylor, The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials: A Personal Memoir (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
1992), 30-32. 
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document in many respects, on the punishment question it took a particularly hard-line 
approach. On the British side, Lord Chancellor John Simon was struck by the legal difficulties 
of an international trial and advocated a political, rather than judicial, solution- such as 
summary executionY In September 1944, Roosevelt and Churchill met for the Octagon 
Conference in Quebec, and Morgenthau and Simon brought their proposals to the discussion. 
Although the Soviet Union was not represented, the plan for a political solution gained 
preliminary approval as official Allied policy. 
Soon after the Octagon Conference, details from the Morgenthau Plan appeared in Ger-
man Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels' radio broadcasts. Roosevelt, running for re-
election, faced accusations of needlessly lengthening the war with policies such as the Mor-
genthau Plan and the demand for unconditional surrender. Due to widespread opposition, 
he publicly withdrew ·his support for the Quebec agreement. 18 Stalin hardened his stance 
in favor of war crimes trials, insisting shortly afterward that "lt.Jhere must be no executions 
without trial, otherwise the world would say we were afraid to try them.'' 19 
Specific plans for a war crimes trial developed in t he US War Department, which was 
headed by veteran politician Henry L. Stimson. In 1931, as Herbert Hoover's Secretary of 
State, Stimson had supported the Kellogg-Briand Pact, and had unsuccessfully called for 
a decisive response to the Japanese invasion of Manchuria. After hearing details of the 
Morgenthau plan just before the Octagon conference, Stimson wrote Morgenthau: "Such 
methods, in my opinion, do not prevent wars; they tend to breed them."20 He immediately 
began preparing a War Department response to Jreasury's Morgenthau Plan, enlisting sup-
port from Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall and Judge Advocate General Myron B. 
Cramer for a judicial solution to the problem of major war criminals. Cramer, who was 
17Smith, Road, 45. 
18Smith, Road, 54-55. 
19 Ftom a summary telegram from Churchill to Roosevelt discussing communication with Stalin. Foreign 
Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers and the Conferences at Malta and Yalta (Washington, 
DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1955), 401. 
20Document 13: "From Henry L. Stimson to Henry Morgenthau, Jr., September 5, 1944" in Bradley F. 
Smith, ed., The American Road to Nuremberg: the Doct£mentary Record (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution 
Press, 1982), 24. 
9 
familiar with the pitfalls of international law, advocated a simple approach: include only 
crimes prosecutable under existing international agreements such as the Geneva Convention, 
and try them under a simplified court-martial. 
A much more extensive plan came from Lieutenant Colonel Murray C. Bernays, a formerly 
civilian attorney who had enlisted as a War Department legal adviser. Bernays' proposal 
included the controversial prosecution of aggressive war as well as an ambitious framework 
for defining "criminal organizations," such as the Gestapo or SS, so that "adjudication of 
guilt would require no proof ... other than membership in the conspiracy."21 Bernays en-
visioned one very large initial trial followed by short hearings to cover all atrocities, not 
just those committed by top leaders. The plan was heavily criticized- even inside the War 
Department- as a pseudo-judicial political solution that could martyr the accused. 
Bernays' idea was almost completely out of favor when an event during the Battle of the 
Bulge saved it. On 17 December 1944, near Malmedy, Belgium, a unit of the First SS Panzer 
Division massacred unarmed civilians and prisoners of war. This event convinced several 
top US officials- including Attorney General Francis Biddle and Judge Samuel Rosenman, 
one of Roosevelt's closest advisors- that a criminal Nazi conspiracy existed. 22 Energized 
by the turn of events, Bernays and General John Weir drafted a memorandum for the 
President eventually signed by Rosenman and three cabinet secretaries-Biddle, Stimson, 
and Secretary of State Edward Stettinius. 
Shortly after receiving the memorandum, Roosevelt departed for the Yalta Conference. 
Since the Conference took place in February 1945 during the final phase of the attack on 
Germany proper, most expected the Big Three to produce a final plan for dealing ·with the 
major war criminals. However, whether because of Yalta's demanding agenda or further 
disagreements on the trial issue, the Yalta Declaration stated only that "the question of the 
21 Document 16: "Trial of European War Criminals (by Colonel Murray C. Bernays, G1), September 15, 
1944" in Smith, American Road, 36. 
22 Smith, American Road, 51. See also the several Documents cited. Ironically, it was later revealed that 
the local commander was entirely responsible for the Malmedy Massacre and the action had not been part 
of any conspiracy. 
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major war criminals should be the subject of inquiry by the three Foreign Secretaries for 
report in due course."23 In March, Roosevelt sent Judge Rosenman to London to work out a 
final plan for dealing with the major war criminals. Rosenman and Lord Chancellor Simon 
initially compromised on summary execution for the highest officials such as Adolf Hitler or 
Hermann Goring, but trials for all others, but on 12 April 1945 the British War Cabinet 
rejected the proposal. Since Roosevelt died on the same day, Rosenman had to return to 
Washington without meeting his goal. 
Bernays' trial plan won its final victory when new President Harry Truman decided during 
his first briefing on the subject that a trial was indispensable. By the month's end, Truman 
had appointed Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson as Chief Counsel of the United 
States for war crimes-before trials were even official Allied policy. Riding the resultant 
. 
tide of publicity, Truman sent Judge Rosenman to the San Francisco Conference, where 
world representatives were founding the postwar United Nations organization.24 Rosenman's 
mission was to secure agreement to a Four-Power trial representing the Republic of France, 
the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The Foreign Ministers agreed 
in principle, but were again too busy to spend much time on specifics in San Francisco, so 
instead scheduled the International Conference on Military Trials (IC.MT) to begin in June 
in London, charged with producing a charter for the court. 
The International Conference on Military Trials 
By the time the ICMT began, the war in Europe was over. Hitler and the highest-ranking 
Nazis-excepting Hermann Goring- were confirmed dead, greatly relieving worries that a 
trial would simply be a vehicle for Nazi propaganda. The other countries' ICMT representa-
tives were no less prestigious than Supreme Court Justice Jackson. The Soviets sent General 
I. T. Nikitchenko of the Soviet Supreme Court and Professor A. N. Thainin, who had written 
a lauded book about Nazi leaders' culpability for the crime of aggressive war. France sent 
23
''The Yalta Conference: Signed Agreements" in Malta and Yalta, 979. 
24Taylor, Anatomy, 45. 
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Judge Robert Falco of their highest court, and Professor Andre Gros, an international law 
authority. British representatives were t.he Lord Chance1lor, Lord Simon, and the Attorney 
General, Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe. Halfway through the Conference, Churchill's coalition 
was defeated in elections and the new representatives became Lord Jowitt aud Sir Hart-
ley Shawcross, though for continuity the new government. kept Maxwell-Fyfe as the official 
British liaison. 
The Cold War rift began to emerge at the conference. General William Donovan, head 
of the US Office of Strategic Services (OSS, precursor to the CIA), took a special interest in 
the major war criminals and heavily influenced Jackson to distrust the Soviets. 25 Jackson's 
doubts about Soviet dedication to a fair trial appeared well-founded when Nikitchenko noted 
that at Yalta "Nazi organizations were declared to be illegal and criminal" and to try them 
. 
would presume the possibility of overruling that decision.26 Three days later, he again 
surprised the conference with the statement, "V.le are dealing here Vi7ith the chief war criminals 
who have already been convicted and whose conviction has already been announced by both 
t.he Moscow and Crimea declarations .... Only the rules of fair trial must., of course, apply." 
Jackson deftly answered that the United States would not set up "a mere formal judicial 
body .... There could be but one decision in this case, ... [b]ut the reason is the evidence and 
not the statements made by heads of state."27 
In addition to facing such political problems, the ICMT also initiated real multilateral 
negotiation on the subject of the trial. Up to this point, discussants had rather naively 
assumed that once they agreed on the principle of a trial, specifics would fall into place. 
Common law, which developed in Britain and the United States, differed in both philoso-
phy and practice from the Roman-derived continental law of France and the Soviet Union. 
Continental law makes no presumption of innocence and regards the judiciary as an arm of 
state power- not as a balance to the legislative and executive branches. 
25 Ann Tusa and John Tusa, The Nuremberg Trial (New York: Atheneum, 1983), 78. 
26Document XIII: "Minutes June 26, 1945" in Jackson, Report, 77. 
27Document XVII: "Minutes June 29, 1945" in Jackson, Report, 104-106. This is especially interesting 
since Nikitchenko was later an IMT judge at Nuremberg. 
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These differences led to misunderstandings and delayed consensus. For example, Jack-
son 's assertion that the court would have no part in prosecuting the criminals confused French 
and Soviet representatives since in their systems the prosecutor was a member of the court. 
The conference solved this problem by clearly specifying separation of powers- a principle of 
common law- in the Charter. Jackson also used the term indictment interchangeably with 
presentation of charges, while in continental law an indictment is a documentary collection 
of charges and evidence. The compromise on this issue included charges and some, but not 
all, of the evidence against the accused in the Indictment. 
Another major issue to be negotiated was the criminality of aggressive war. This was 
unsurprising considering the imperfections of the various Allies- the USSR had aLtacked 
Poland, Finland, the Baltics, and Japan, and the Western Powers sent expeditions against 
. 
Norway, Iceland, Persia (Iran), and various Vichy French possessions, all in violation of 
treaties. French representative Gros first called the Crimes Against Peace charge into ques-
tion on 19 July 1945 on these points: "It is a creation by four people ... .It is ex post facto 
legislation ... .It is declaring as settled someLhing discussed for years as if we were a codifi-
cation commission." To this, Jackson characteristically replied, "But we are a codification 
commission for the purposes of this trial as I see it."28 Since the issue had been discussed 
twice before in Washington, within the War Department and the Cabinet, Jackson should 
have offered more convincing arguments. For example, a memorandum existed LhaL persua-
sively argued the criminality of aggressive war under current international law, but Jacksoll 
never referred to it or its arguments.29 
Soviet representatives attempted to settle the issue by placing a key phrase in Part 
(a), Article VI, the charge of aggressive war, defining aggressive war as criminal only when 
committed by the Axis Powers- to which Jackson vehemently objected. 
A stalemate ensued for several sessions, leading Jackson to suggest that each of the Allies 
28Document XXXVII: "Minutes July 19, 1945" in Jackson, Report, 295-296. 
29Document 30: "War Department Memorandum (by Major Brown and Colonel Bernays, Gl) , January 
4, 1945" in Smith, American Road, 93. It is possible Jackson himself never saw the document, but he would 
have been familiar with the ideas since Bernays was on his TCMT staff. 
13 
could conduct separate trials. The proposal was threatening to the USSR, which had only 
one suspected major war criminal in custody, Grand Admiral Erich Raeder, and so would get 
little publicity.30 Jackson flew to Potsdam to meet with President Truman, who instructed 
him to back off on separate trials pending the Potsdam Declaration, which may have saved 
the ICMT. It stated specifica1ly that the Allies wanted a single trial and hoped thai "the 
negotiations in London will result in speedy agreement."31 Returning on 2 August 1945, 
Jackson found everyone ready to include the aggressive war charge without the controversial 
phrase. After another week finalizing the phrasing of translations, Jackson and the other 
representatives signed the Charter of the International Military Tribunal on 8 August 1945. 
The trial would begin at the earliest feasible date- October 1945, less than two months away. 
The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg 
When the trial opened, the Allies had occupied Germany for about five months. During 
the war they had concentrated on military campaigning but done little planning for what 
would happen after the end of hostilities. The majority of the Potsdam Declaration dealt with 
details of the Four-Power occupation in Germany, whose mission was to make it "possible for 
!the German people] in due course to take their place among the free and peaceful peoples 
of the world."32 
Postwar Germany was just beginning to take shape. The Allies ruled through the Con-
trol Council, which included British, French, Soviet, and United States representatives. Each 
country's occupation forces translated each Control Council decision into policy in its re-
spective zone. The Allies kept the German bureaucracy mostly intact after purging Nazis 
from the civil service and local government, though at least at the beginning occupation 
guidelines were sometimes vague or unevenly applied. Against t his background. the IMT 
30Taylor, Anatomy, 89. 
31 For an example of Jackson's statements, see Document XVII: ''1\1inutes of Conference Session of June 
29, 1945" in Jackson, Report, 115. The full text of the Potsdam Declaration is available at 
< http:/ / www.yale.edujlawwebjavalon/decade/decadel7.htm>; see Part VI. War Criminals. 
32
"The Potsdam Declaration." Available 12 October 2000 
< http://www .yale.edu/ lawweb/ avalon/ decade/ decadel7.htm> . 
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was virtually the only joint, well-planned project that took place. Despite disagreements , 
the Allies were pursuing a definite goal to provide "indisputable proof of the [criminality of 
the) Nazi regime" such as a trial would give.33 
The victorious powers had learned from the mistakes made at the Versailles Peace Confer-
ence after World War I, which the Nazis had used to rise to power in Germany. Though there 
are a few striking similarities between the Treaty of Versailles and the Potsdam Declaration-
such as Germany bearing sole guilt for the war and having to pay reparations-in 1945, the 
Allies were in full control and determined to reform the German people. With this in mind, 
the Indictment submitted to the Nuremberg IMT targeted not just Nazis and their party 
apparatus but also bankers and industrialists and longer-lived organizations such as "the Gen-
eral Staff of the High Command of the German Armed Forces."34 The Allies also wanted 
. 
to prove to the world-including their own citizens-that they had acted rightly and that 
World War II had been a just war. This purpose was closely tied to the Allies' idealistic 
hopes of setting up a stable and rational postwar order, exemplified in the founding of the 
United Nations. 
The Court and Defendants 
Time constraints forced the prosecution to rush preparation of the Nuremberg Indictment, 
which it finally submitted on 6 October 1945, just twelve days before the trial began. After 
signing the London Charter, Jackson had only about two months to decide on defendants, 
collect evidence, and bring formal charges. A preliminary list of names had included twenty-
four defendants and six accused organizations, who were selected to represent all the major 
branches of Nazism and anti-democratic Germany. Though the prosecution would have done 
well to revise this list, time did not allow.35 
33Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, quoted in Bradley F. Smith, Reaching Judgment at Nuremberg (New York: 
Basic Books, 1977), 42. 
34
''1ndictment Against Hermann Goring et al." International Military Tribunal, Trial of the Major War 
Criminals before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 14 November 1945-1 October 1946, 42 vols. 
(Nuremberg: International Military 'fribunal, 1947). Available 12 October 2000 
< http:/ jwww.yale.edu/ lawweb/ avalon/imt/ proc/ count.htm> . 
35Taylor, Anatomy, 90. 
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The most famous defendant was Hermann Goring, who had long been the number two 
man in the Nazi party and headed the Luftwaffe (Air Force). He was, as Justice Jackson 
later stated in court, "the only living man who can expound ... the true purposes of the Nazi 
Party and the inner workings of its leadership."36 The highest-ranking SS survivor, Ernst 
Kaltenbrunner, was indicted, as were other organizational heads such as Joachim Ribben-
trop (Foreign Minister) , Albert Speer (Minister for Armaments after 1942) , and Robert Ley 
(Labor Front). Defendants outside the Nazi hierarchy included career military officers, in-
dustrialists, and conservative politicians such as Grand Admiral Karl Donitz, head of the 
German Navy and Hitler's successor as Fuhrer; Field Marshall Wilhelm Keitel , head of the 
High Command of the Armed Forces; Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach of the Krupp 
conglomerate; and Franz von Papen, Chancellor in 1932 and influential in Hitler's 1933 
. 
appointment as Chancellor. 
The London Charter required that the International Military Tribunal meet in Berlin 
to receive the Indictment, though for practical reasons the ICMT had selected Nuremberg 
as the site of the triaL At this meeting, Britain, France, the Soviet Union, and the United 
States were each represented by two judges, one voting and a non-voting alternate. The 
judges announced the election of Lord Geoffrey Lawrence of Great Britain as President of 
the Tribunal and that the first court session would be in Nuremberg on 20 November 1945. 
Before the first session , Robert Ley hanged himself in his Nuremberg cell, escaping trial. 
Then, on 7 November the Tribunal's medical team pronounced Gustav Krupp unable to 
travel from his Austrian villa. This announcement led to a brief prosecution attempt to 
either try Gustav in absentia or amend the Indictment to add his son Alfried, against whom 
there was a stronger case. The latter strategy prompted main French judge Donncdieu 
de Vabres to demand, "Do you consider that you can propose to the Court to substitute 
one name for another?"37 Though the rejection of both alternatives hurt the prosecution 's 
36
"Cross Examination of Hermann Goring, March 18, 1946" in IMT, Trial, 9:417. Available 12 October 
2000 < http:/ / www.yale.edu/ lawweb/ avalon/ imt/ proc/ 031846.htm> . 
37
"Preliminary Hearing: Wednesday, 14 i\'"ovember 1945" in IMT, Trial. Available 12 October 2000 
< http:/ jwww.yale.edu/lawweb/ avalon/ imtf proc/ ll-14-45.htm> . 
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prestige, it perhaps strengthened the Tribunal's reputation for justice. 
Proceedings 
The prosecution, which dominated most of the proceedings, had separated the presenta-
tion of its case into four phases, which would be covered by teams from the United States, 
Great Britain, France, and the Soviet Union respecUvely. The first phase dealt. with Count 
One, "the formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy," a charge only implied 
in the London Charter. On 21 November, Justice Jackson gave his opening address , "an 
optimistic, Wilsonian credo that looked to the future as much as to the past and that saw 
the trial as a blow against aggressive wars."38 The conspiracy charge was based on a good 
deal of evidence ranging from Mein Kampf to secret Nazi party meetings that , the prosecu-
tion argued, showed that Hitler and other top Nazis planned aggressive warfare and other 
atrocities all along. vVhile the prosecution had a good case against several defendants, the 
conspiracy presentation tended to oversimplify the workings of Nazi Germany as a mono-
lithic state bent to one end. In reality, and as the defendants later argued, there were no 
well-planned and detailed goals- only general ones. 
The United States' phase concentrated on documentary evidence (as opposed to wit-
nesses), which resulted in copying and translation problems as well as boredom for the 
whole courtroom. However, some of the documents did cause a stir, such as a report on 
the destruction of the Warsaw Ghetto, which glorified the "energetic action" of the SS even 
though it was so one-sided that there were only 16 casualties verses 56,065 "proved" killed.39 
An innovation in presentation was professionally prepared film evidence from Nazi and Allied 
archives, which was presented though screenings with titles such as The Nazi Plan and Nazi 
Concentr-ation Camps.40 The United States team received a great deal of publicity for this, 
though the evidence presented in later phases would have been no less shocking had it come 
first. 
38Marrus, Nuremberg Trial, 83-84. 
39 Quoted in Taylor, A nato my, 170; also see the reaction on page 202. 
40Taylor, Anatomy, 200, and Marrus, Nuremberg Trial, 125. 
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The British phase was very short since it concentrated on Count Two (Crimes Against 
Peace), and consequently was little more than a list. of treaties and when the Nazis had 
violated them. This does not mean that the British did not fully support the trial. Though 
there were only about one-tenth as many British as Americans, British barristers had already 
assisted during part of the United States phase. The British presented this part of the case 
well, and the American press amusingly "soon formed the opinion that the British prosecution 
team was plainly superior."41 
After the British phase, the United States and British prosecutors made a joint summa-
tion of evidence against each defendant. Following this, the court asked the prosecution to 
better define the criminal organizations, particularly the requirements for membership. For 
example, General Staff was a generic term, and while an officer might be identified as a staff 
. 
officer, this was hardly membership in an organization. Also, the SS had actually drafted 
members late in the war; would draftees be guilty along with volunteers? General Roman 
Rudenko, Soviet. head prosecutor, stated that "naturally, we cannot exclude the possibility 
that there might be individual members who might. have been lured into the organization."42 
Unfortunately, millions of members pleading ignorance of an organization's criminality would 
remove the charge's main benefit. 
Next began the French prosecution phase. The French and Soviets each covered both 
Counts Three (War Crimes) and Four (Crimes Against Humanity), with the French focus-
ing on Western and the Soviets on Eastern Europe. Like the British, the French had a 
small prosecution team- understandably since most of the new French government's ener-
gies went into rebuilding France's institutions. They made forceful presentation of life under 
Nazi occupation, however, including Germanization, Gestapo torture, broad reprisals, and 
deportations. Even many defendants were disgusted at Goring's participation in the theft 
of art treasures to sell for personal profit.43 
41 Taylor, Anatomy, 213 and 220. 
42IMT, Trial, 8:471. 
43From the diary of G. M. Gilbert, Nuremberg Prison Psychologist, quoted in Taylor, Anatomy, 305-306. 
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The Soviet phase had a completely different character. The Nuremberg IMT took place 
shortly after the war's end, and the West was still discovering the the wartime brutality 
in Eastern Europe. French complaints about the destruction of vVorld War I monuments 
seemed absurd compared to the tales of the millions slaughtered in Poland. Not to be 
outdone, the Soviets also presented a film , Atrocities by the German Fascist Invaders in 
the USSR that was much more graphic than the earlier ones. Other testimony covered 
the Einsatzgruppen, specialized SS units that shot Jews and Communist officials behind 
battle lines in the USSR, and ''previously little-known information" about death camps like 
Auschwitz, where systematic killing was an added concentration camp terror.44 After Soviet 
testimony, any defendant closely connected to these atrocities-such as Hans Frank, governor 
of Poland- was almost assured a death penalty . 
. 
The defense cases, though most were individually strong, helped the prosecution overall 
since many defendants tried to save themselves by implicating others. Of course, defense 
counsel were at a significant disadvantage compared to the prosecution. Most obviously, the 
London Charter, which governed the Tribunal and established its jurisdiction, had been writ-
ten specifically to convict a list of war criminals that was "conveniently settled in advance.u45 
While the authors may not have had each individual defendant in mind, the Charter's defi-
nition of international law at least put them in a bad light. Additionally, public opinion so 
opposed the Nazis that the defense certainly knew that many people were convinced only 
''with some difficulty, that summary execution was not a desirable solution."46 The defense 
was also hurt by lack of time and resources--documents the prosecution had used were 
available, but the Allied archives were not. 
After the Soviet phase concluded, the defense began its presentation with the case of 
Hermann Goring, who took the witness stand. Although in the Nazi regime's later years 
he had become a slovenly drug addict, during his time in prison he had returned to his 
44Marrus, Nuremberg Trial, 197. 
45Michael Biddiss, ''Victor's Justice? The Nuremberg Trial" History Today, 45:5 (:May 1995), 46. 
46Michael Marrus, "The Nuremberg Trial: Fifty Years After" American Scholar 66:4 (Autumn 1997), 565. 
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former fit and shrewd self. His testimony, though it failed to help his case since he freely 
admitted many crimes, was impressive in its scope and detail. Goring attempted to discredit 
the Tribunal by implying that its basis in international law was outdated or simply wrong: 
"[Following] these Hague Convention regulations for land warfare, ... a modern war could not 
be fought under any circumstances."47 During Jackson's cross-examination, Goring seemed 
to outsmart the Supreme Court Justice through superior knowledge of the facts. Telford 
Taylor, one of the United States team, observed, "It was a blow from which Jackson only 
gradually recovered."48 
Most other defendants had far less spectacular cases. Ernst Kaltenbrunner had headed 
the Reich :y:Jain Security Office of the SS, which controlled both the Gestapo and the Ein-
satzgruppen. He unconvincingly argued that he really had authority only over matters of 
. 
security and intelligence, while SS leader Heinrich Rimmler had exercised direct control over 
most matters- naturally including the criminal ones. Another example was Albert Speer, a 
young architect who became Armaments Minister during the war, who revealed to the court 
that he had considered killing Hitler. Unlike Kaltenbrunner, however, Speer stated "!we] 
leaders must accept a common responsibility .... But to what extent that is punishable under 
law or ethics I cannot decide."49 Speer, though one of the few to accept any responsibility 
for wartime actions, still limited his personal culpability. 
The case of Karl Donitz, head of the German ~avy after 1943, set a precedent in inter-
national law concerning submarine warfare. To defend him against the charge that orders 
to sink merchant vessels were illegal, Donitz's lawyer Otto Kranzbuhler secured an affidavit 
from Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz, commander of the United States Pacific Fleet. Nimitz 
answered questions describing the practice of the United States Navy concerning submarines 
and merchant ships, especially when a submarine crew had no way of knowing whether or not 
an enemy merchant ship was armed. German practice was indistinguishable from American, 
47Hermann Goring, "Testimony on the Applicability of the Hague Conventions of 1907, March 15, 1946" 
in Marrus, Nuremberg Trial, 180. 
48Taylor, Anatomy, 344. 
49Speer's testimony in IMT, Trial, 16:586 and quoted in Taylor, Anatomy, 453. 
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making it "as clear as clear could be that if Doenitz and [German Admiral Erich] Raeder 
deserved to hang for sinking ships without warning, so did Nimitz."50 The court acquitted 
Donitz and Raeder on the charge. 
Judgment 
After the last defense case rested, closing statement::; by the defense and prosecution 
followed and, on 31 August 1946, the Tribunal adjourned to prepare its judgment. Exten::;ive 
notes taken by Francis Biddle, main judge for the United States, reveal the process by which 
the Tribunal reached its decisions during the recess. 51 British and American staff did most 
of the work since they had the best knowledge of Anglo-American law, on which the London 
Charter was based. The judges themselves met for several sessions to discuss the individual 
guilt of each defendant for the Indictment's four counts: Conspiracy, Crimes Against Peace, 
War Crimes, and Crimes Against Humanity. 
In reaching its decision, the Tribunal never strayed from the London Charter in inter-
preting international law. Challenges to the inclusion of Crimes Against Peace, based on 
the Kellogg-Briand Pact, were ignored since the Charter was the law by which the Tribunal 
judged. The Indictment's first charge, Conspiracy, was especially problematic since it was 
neither defined in the Charter nor a crime under Lhe law practiced in France or Germany. 
French judge De Vabres argued that the charge could not then be part of international law 
and so should be thrown out, but the oLhers overruled him. Only eight defendants, out of 
twenty-two, were convicted on Count One, and none were convicted solely on it. 
The Tribunal read the judgment between 30 September and 1 October 1946. Twelve 
defendants- Martin Bormann, Hermann Goring, Alfred Jodl , Wilhelm Keitel , Ernst Kalten-
brunner, Hans Frank, \.Yilhelm Frick, Joachim Ribbentrop, Alfred Rosenberg, F'l:itz Saukel, 
Arthur Seyss-Inquart, and Julius Streicher were sentenced to hang. Each was found guilty 
of Crimes Against Humanity, and also of vVar Crimes in every case except that of anti-
50Taylor, Anatomy, 409. 
51 According to Taylor, these notes are now at Syracuse University. Taylor, Anatomy, 549. 
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Semitic publisher Julius Streicher. Three defendants- Franz von Papen, Hjalmar Schacht, 
and Hans Fritsche- were acquitted of being major war criminals, but after being released 
were arrested by German police and convicted of lesser crimes.52 Three others received life 
sentences, with the remaining four getting sentences ranging from ten (Admiral Donitz) to 
twenty (Albert Speer) years. They served their time as the only inmates of Spandau Prison 
in the British section of Berlin. On 16 October 1946, after a petition to the Control Council 
was denied, those so sentenced were hanged in the Nuremberg prison gymnasium, ending 
the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg. 
The International Military Tribunal for the Far East 
Unlike Germany, Japan was not invaded and did not surrender unconditionally, but rather 
. 
accepted the terms of the Potsdam Protocol. Its provisions were not generous, but reassured 
Japanese leaders by stating that a new government would be established ''in accordance 
with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people," an ambiguous statement that allowed 
for the Emperor's retention53 While the Potsdam Protocol also specified that war criminals 
would be punished, it did not state under what laws or mandate a trial of suspected major 
criminals. 
Though the London Charter was signed before Japan surrendered, the Japanese govern-
ment had little time to give its implications much thought, and had good reason to assume 
that the Allies played by different rules in Europe and Asia. Just before midnight on 8 
August 1945, the same day the Allies signed the London Charter, Soviet troops invaded 
Japanese-contro11ed Manchuria, a violation of a neutrality pact that would not expire until 
25 April1946. The next day t he United States used the second atomic bomb, on Nagasaki , 
killing over 70,000 civilian Japanese, as well as 2,500 Korean laborers and 350 prisoners of 
war. Since both of these actions- had they been committed by the Axis- would have been 
indictable under the London Charter, it is unlikely Japan 's top leaders would have thought 
52Taylor, Anatomy, 613-614. 
63http:/ j www.yale.edu/ lawweb/ avalon/ decade/ decadel7.htm> . 
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they would be indicted for similar actions when they surrendered on 15 August. 
Such contradictions did not just come at the end; the war in East Asia had been full of 
them. Perhaps most obviously, it was a war of colonial empires. Except for self-ruled parts 
of China and Thailand, the territories Japan attacked- including Hawaii- were populated 
mainly by Asians but ruled by Western overlords. Though early defeats of the imperial 
powers stimulated local independence movements, the victors restored the prewar status quo 
after defeating Japan. The American occupation censorship bureau even renamed the war-
from the Great East Asia War ( Taiheiyo-Senso) to the Pacific War-to emphasize the role 
of the United States in a predominately Asian conftict.54 
The Japanese had been at war since 1937 and invariably committed the worst atrocities, 
but both sides participated on a much larger scale than in Western Europe. Allied soldiers 
regularly shot defenseless Japanese pilots or seamen, ignored the few attempts to surrender, 
. 
and collected grisly souvenirs. These practices were well-knuwn, but it would have been 
"inconceivable, however, that teeth, ears, and skulls could have been collected from German 
or Italian war dead and publicized in the Anglo-American countries without provoking an 
uproar."55 
Unlike Germany, Japan still had a representative government at the war's end, though 
one with many voices silenced though heavy censorship. Military control of Japan stemmed 
from the requirement in Japan 's Meiji Constitution that both the Army and Navy Cabinet 
Ministers be active officers, which meant that the military could remove a Prime Minister 
at will by withdrawing its ministers. Prior to the 1930s, the military had responsible leaders 
and Japan appeared to be a conservative but stable constitutional monarchy. A period in 
the 1920s known as the Taisho Democracy was especially noted for its strong multiparty 
government. 
However, the military's aggressive attitude grew after World War I, and in the late 1920s 
54 Dower, Defeat, 419. 
55 John W. Dower, War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War (New York: Pantheon, 1986), 
6G. 
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the military heavily influenced politics through assassination and intrigue. The pretense of 
civilian government finally ended in 1931, when the Kwantung Army took control of foreign 
affairs by invading Manchuria against government orders. Contrary to the stereotype of 
a monolithic Japan in Allied propaganda, by 1945 many Japanese welcomed defeat since 
it removed the militarists from power. These Japanese expected occupation authorities 
to mandate removal of the military's autonomy, gather reparations, and then leave- some 
business leaders were even overjoyed at being governed by American capitalists.56 
The former Empire of Japan was split less cooperatively than Germany. Of the major 
Allies, United States troops had dominated the fighting, and likewise the occupation. US 
General of the Army Douglas MacArthur became Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers 
(SCAP), and his word was final in Japan. The US occupied Okinawa, southern Korea, 
and most of the home islands with British Commonwealth soldiers in a few places such 
as Hiroshima. The Chinese Nationalist government got back Taiwan, which Japan had 
controlled since 1895, and Japanese-occupied parts of China. The Soviet Union received 
control of Manchuria, northern Korea, and the arctic island of Sakhalin, but had no part in 
occupying the Japanese homeland. 
Throughout the war, Allied leaders had promised war crimes trials for violations of the 
Geneva Convention as the Allied public reacted to stories of cruelty to prisoners of war. 
The highest officers connected with some of the most notorious events of the war were tried 
very quickly. Japanese Generals Masaharu Homma and Tomoyuki Yamashita, commanders 
respectively at the Bataan Death March and the Sack of Manila, were tried and sentenced 
to death in late 1945, despite the fact that there was no compelling evidence that either was 
even notified by the junior officers who ordered the crimes.57 These early trials under the 
Geneva Conventions also opened the possibility of a trial, under an arrangement similar to 
56Dower, Defeat, 530. 
57 Japanese names are given in Western order, with given name first. Yamashita appealed to the US 
Supreme Court, who decided the case was out of its jurisdiction but with a dissenting opinion calling his 
trial ''legalized lynching." See ''Yamashita, Tomoyuki, General" in The Oxford Companion to World War II 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1995), 1292. 
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Nuremberg, of Japanese leaders responsible for the war itself. 
When the occupation began, a popular topic of debate was the controversial possibility 
that the Emperor might be held as a war crimes suspect. MacArthur planned to rehabili-
tate the Emperor, Japan's most important symbol, whom he saw as the key to successful 
democratization. He also purposefully declined to have experts on Japan in his occupation 
staff, preferring to have a thorough, American-style, common-sense democratization car-
ried out by occupation forces.58 Since the United States maintained complete control with 
MacArthur as Supreme Commander, in most areas he could implement his wishes without 
negotiation. MacArthur made his support for the Emperor clear on 27 September, when he 
invited Hirohito to his residence, one of his first actions "to create the most usable emperor 
possible."59 
At the same tfme, plans to create a Far East counterpart to the IMT began. The 
Nuremberg trial was just beginning, and Japan, like Nazi Germany, had leaders to try for 
major crimes such as ordering the attack on Pearl Harbor or the mistreatment of prisoners 
of war. A Joint Chiefs of Staff directive formed the International Prosecution Section (IPS) 
to investigate war crimes, and President Truman named as its head Joseph Keenan, author 
of the Lindbergh kidnapping law and an influential New Dealer under President Franklin 
Roosevelt.6° Keenan's former position, Assistant to the Attorney General, was noticeably 
inferior to that of the European prosecutor, Supreme Court Justice Jackson, leading to 
speculation that Truman simply wanted Keenan out of Washington. 61 Despite its name, at 
first the IPS staff was entirely American. 
The Court and Defendants 
International Military Tribunal for the Far East was unilaterally instigated with a SCAP 
58Dower, Defeat, 224. 
59Dower, Defeat, 299. 
60Philip Piccagallo, The Japanese on Trial (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1979), 10. Richard Minear, 
Victor's Justice: The Tokyo War Crimes Trial (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1971), 40. 
61 Arnold Brackman, The Other Nuremberg: The Untold Story of the Tokyo War Crimes Trial (New York: 
Wil1i.am Morrow and Company, 1987), 32. 
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Special Proclamation on 19 January 1946. Drafted by the IPS, the proclamation was nearly 
identical to the London Charter, with a few important exceptions. There could be as many 
as eleven judges, with no alternates, to be "appointed by the Supreme Commander for the 
Allied Powers from the names submitted by the signatories to the Instrument of Surrender, 
India, and the Commonwealth of the Philippines." Also, in keeping with the US dominance 
of the occupation, MacArthur named a single head prosecutor- Keenan- who had subordi-
nates appointed by any nation involved in the war against Japan. Additionally, though the 
prosecutable crimes-Crimes Against Peace, War Crimes, and Crimes Against Humanity-
were the same, the jurisdiction of the IMTFE included only defendants "charged with offenses 
which include Crimes Against Peace."62 
MacArthur, who theoretically controlled the whole process, took little interest in the 
IMTFE. He appointed the judges suggested by the Allies without reviewing their merits, 
with disheartening results. Only one, Radhabinod Pal of India, had any prior experience 
in international law, though few Nuremberg judges had such experience either. Five other 
judges had various shortcomings. Mei Ju-Ao of China had no judicial experience, and, as 
Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Chinese legislature, was a politician by oc-
cupation. General I. M. Zaryanov of the USSR, besides being a major figure in Stalin's 
show-trial purges, spoke no English or Japanese, the 'fribunal's official languages. Delfin 
Jaranilla, though a member of the Supreme Court of the Philippines, was a survivor of 
the Bataan Death March, which would disqualify him from trying a similar case in most 
Anglo-American courts. Likewise, during the war William Webb of Australia had coordi-
nated investigations of war crimes committed by lower-ranking Japanese. John Higgins, the 
United States' first appointee, returned to his seat on the Superior Court of Massachusetts 
before the trial began, possibly because Keenan expressed disappointment that the US had 
not appointed a Supreme Court Justice.63 Myron Cramer, Judge Advocate General of the 
62
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Army, who had previously been influent ial in War Department planning for war crimes trials, 
replaced him. On the other hand, Canada (E. Stuart McDougall) , the United Kingdom (Lord 
William Patrick) , the Netherlands (B. V. A. Roling), New Zealand (Harvey Northcraft), and 
France (Henri Bernard) sent well-selected representatives. 
The IPS became truly international with the addition of Allied assistant prosecutors, 
whom Keenan consulted when preparing the list of defendants and the Indictment. When 
Soviet representative S. A. Golunsky arrived, he asserted that the USSR had the right to 
choose independently two defendants. Keenan reluctantly agreed, expecting the Soviets to 
name bosses of Japan's zaibatsu- huge family-controlled industrial conglomerates- which 
the Soviet press had criticized as the root of Japanese capitalist aggression. Surprisingly, 
Golunsky named the two signatories to the Instrument of Surrender: General Yoshijiro 
Umezu, former com~ander of the Kwantung Army along the Soviet border, and Mamoru 
Shigemitsu, former Ambassador to Moscow- neither of whom had been detained as a major 
offender.64 Each nation represented on the prosecution staff had input, and so where at 
Nuremberg four nations split four counts evenly, at Tokyo the resulting Indictment included 
fifty-five separate counts. By the time the Tokyo Indictment was published on 29 April1946, 
it was shorter than the Nuremberg Indictment but far less organized. 
The defendants named in the Tokyo Indictment were meant to represent aspects of 
Japanese aggression. Over half of the twenty-eight were mili tary men, including fourteen 
generals- Sadao Araki , Kenji Doihara, Shunroku Hata, Seishiro Itagaki, Heitaro Kimura, 
Kuniaki Koiso, lwane Matsui, Jiro Minami, Akira Muto, Hiroshi Oshima, Kenryo Sato, Tei-
ichi Suzuki, Hideki Tojo, and Yoshijiro Umezu-and three admirals- Osumi Nagano, Taka-
sumi Oka, and Shigetaro Shimada. Additionally indicted were a military propagandist-
Colonel Kingoro Hashimoto-and two civilian ones-diplomat Toshio Shiratori and Shumei 
Okawa, who while he "did not at any time hold an important responsible government posi-
tion .. . was the intellectual leader behind Japan's entire aggressive program."65 Top civilian 
64Brackman, Other Nuremberg, 81. 
65Solis Horowitz, ''The Tokyo Trial" International Conciliation 465 (Nov 1950), 581. 
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representatives included two Prime Ministers- Kiichiro Hiranuma and Koki Hirota (Koiso 
and Tojo were also Prime Ministers, but are counted among the generals here)- and three 
Foreign Ministers- Yosuke Matsuoka, Mamoru Shigemitsu, and Shigenori Togo. Other for-
mer cabinet members were Naoki Hoshino (Cabinet Secretary) and Okinori Kaya (Minister 
of Finance). Lastly, in a class by himself, was Marquis Koichi Kido, Lord Keeper of the 
Privy Seal, who in many eyes was indicted as the Emperor's proxy. No zaibatsu leaders were 
indicted. 
A preliminary hearing of the IMTFE on 3 May 1946, revealed a distinct disadvantage 
for the defense. Australian \.Yilliam Webb, who had been elected President of the Tribunal, 
declared that no counsel would be heard in court without being specifically selected by a 
defendant as his representative. This dispute led to the resignation of the Chief of Defense 
Counsel, US Navy Captain Beverly Coleman, who felt that the bench was biased toward 
the prosecution. The entire Navy contingent of the defense team also resigned in protest.66 
Though each defendant still had representation, this seriously harmed the defense as a whole, 
especially since Japanese lawyers usually play lit tle role in court and so were relying heavily 
on US lawyers. 67 The prosecution, coordinated by Keenan, presented a single flowing case, 
while the defense fragmented into separate and often antagonistic cases. Additionally, defense 
resources, according to prosecution member Solis Horowitz, "were not as extensive ... [but] 
upon completion of the prosecution case, prosecution language, document , and reproduction 
facilities were made available for the defense."68 This meant that during the prosecution case, 
defense counsel had virtually no method of preparing evidence for their cases or checking 
the translation of prosecution documents, aside from personal time out of court. 
These language and documentary problems were a far larger issue in the IMTPE than 
the IMT. Though Japanese borrows much of its vocabulary from Chinese, grammatically 
"Japanese is basically as different from Chinese as it is from English."69 The language's 
66Brackrnan, Other Nuremberg, 115. 
67Horowitz, ''Tokyo 'IJ:ial," 491-492. 
68Horowitz, ''Tokyo 'IJ:iaJ," 493. 
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structure makes it notoriously difficult to translate simultaneously, which made a system 
like that used at Nuremberg impossible. Court time dragged on during witness examination 
while questions and answers were translated sentence by sentence. Translation of documents 
was no easier, and both prosecution and defense suffered from shortages of time, translators, 
and even paper. 
Proceedings 
The prosecution developed its case chronologically, beginning with a discussion of the 
Japanese takeover of Manchuria in 1931 and proceeding to the war with China after 1937 and 
the attacks of December 1941 which led to the Pacific War. These were Crimes Against Peace 
in the meaning of the Charter, but Keenan seemed to have little appreciation against whom 
they were committed .• In his opening statement, he claimed the defendants were "determined 
to destroy ... the system of government of and by and for the people"- a description that fit 
neither warlord-controlled Manchuria nor the Western colonial empires.70 
Many defendants were heavily implicated in war crimes and other atrocities such as 
the Mukden Incident in Manchuria (Araki and Doihara) , the Rape of Nanking (Matsui and 
Hashimoto), and the encouragement of opium trafficking to fund the government of Japanese-
controlled Manchuria (Hoshino and Kaya). As for the mistreatment of prisoners of war, the 
prosecution succeeded in showing that the practice was widespread, but never produced evi-
dence that it had been explicitly ordered at the highest level. The Japanese had been far less 
meticulous about record-keeping than the Germans, so the prosecution relied more heavily 
on affidavits and witness testimony. More valuable than these sources, however, was t he 
diary of Marquis Kido, which he had voluntarily turned over to the prosecution. According 
to Horowitz, it was their "working bible ... and the main key to all further investigation."71 
The prosecution case took about seven months, from 3 June 1946 to 27 January 1947.72 
70 Joseph Keenan, "Opening Statement" in Trial of the Japanese War Criminals, 35. Hawaii was a territory 
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The defense case began shortly afterward, and at the beginning attempted to present a 
unified case despite the Chief of Defense Counsel's resignation. However, each defendant's 
case was often antagonistic toward others, anddefense counsel faced continuous problems 
procuring documents and finding witnesses. Finally, after five months, the defense requested 
a recess to avoid a collapse. The Tribunal reluctantly agreed to a six-week break which began 
23 June 1947.73 After the court reconvened, the defense cases lasted another six months, 
untill2 January 1948.74 
Kenzo Takayanagi , perhaps the foremost expert on Anglo-American law in Japan, opened 
the defense in February 1947 with arguments against several charges in the Indictment. He 
suggested that the Anglo-American concept of conspiracy had no basis in international law. 
Takayanagi also attacked the Tribunal for misusing Japanese agreement to war crimes trials 
in the surrender, arguing that the Japanese government had understood this to mean only 
conventional war crimes as defined by the Geneva and Hague Conventions, such as looting 
or mistreatment of prisoners. The inclusion of the Crimes Against Peace charge, especially, 
violated the Potsdam Protocol. 
Few generals had much to say in their own defense. General Tojo, who had been Prime 
Minister at the time of Pearl Harbor, was the most famous defendant and his arguments 
were typical. Tojo argued that Japan was fighting a war of self-defense, not from military 
attack obviously, but from economic encirclement. In the early 1930s, civil war in Chi na 
and the Great Depression seriously threatened Japan's economy. In China, the Nationalists 
boycotted Japanese goods while the Communists attacked Japanese businesses. Western na-
t ions, especially the United States, became increasingly protectionist and hostile to Japanese 
imports, tying them to raw materials exports. Japan's only options, the militarists argued, 
were to contract to a smaller and more vulnerable nation, or to expand and capture raw 
materials at the source in places like Manchuria. The United States actually forced Japan 
to war in mid-1941 by cutting off vital war supplies while Japan was involved in a war in 
73Brackman, Other Nuremberg, 310-311. 
74Brackman, Other Nuremberg, 356. 
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China. 
Some civilian defendants , primarily Foreign Ministers Togo and Shigemitsu, had st-ronger 
cases due to prewar opposition to the militarists. Baron Hankey, a member of Churchill's War 
Cabinet and personal friend of the defendant Shigemitsu, worked in London upon hearing 
of the Indictment to gather evidence of Shigemitsu's efforts for peace and his powerlessness 
against the military. In a manuscript published after the trial, he took up Togo's cause as 
well. The Indictment charged that Shigemitsu and Togo had "w·aged a war of aggression" 
against various countries and failed "to secure the observance and prevent breaches" of the 
laws of war.75 As for their involvement in Crimes Against Peace, "Study of the documents, 
however, reveals ... both were lifelong workers for peace. Both were opposed to an Alliance 
with the European Axis. Both openly opposed the military party .... Togo, at the risk of his 
life, brought the war to an end; and Shigemitsu, at the risk of his life, signed the surrender."76 
In dealing with war crimes, Hankey found that both had done what could be expected of a 
Foreign Minister; they passed on complaints from the Allies and the Swiss (representing the 
International Red Cross) to the responsible authoriLy (the Japanese military), and returned 
replies, though the military took no action. 77 
Judgment 
After the defense rested, the Tribunal heard prosecution and defense rebuttal until 6 April 
1948.78 The IMTFE then adjourned to formulate its opinion. No counterpart to Biddle's 
extensive notes exist for the Tokyo bench, so very little is known about how the Tokyo 
judgment developed. It is known that the IMTFE did not meet together, but rather "seven 
organized the drafting, and presented the results to the other four as a fait accompli."79 
The recess lasted almost seven months.80 The IMTFE dismissed all challenges to its 
75
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jurisdiction. On 12 November 1948, the reading of the verdicts and majority opinion was 
accompanied by the announcement of five additional opinions; three were full dissents and 
two were critical of some aspects.81 No defendants were acquitted and all but two (Matsui 
and Shigemitsu) were found guilty of the controversial conspiracy charge. 'I\vo defendants, 
Matsuoka and Nagano, had died of natural causes during the trial, and Okawa was under 
psychiatric and medical care for symptoms of advanced syphilis. Seven were sentenced to 
hang: Doihara, Hirota, Itagaki, Kimura, Matsui, Muto, and Tojo. Shigemitsu got seven 
years, Togo twenty, and the rest life sentences. 
After sentencing, defendants could appeal to MacArthur. Several defense attorneys pre-
pared an extensive criticism of the judgment as unfair and not in keeping with the spirit 
of the trial. Some individual defendants asked to have their life sentences 'reduced' to 
hanging-highlighting a difference in Japanese and Western value systems. On 25 Novem-
her MacArthur rejected all petitions. After an attempt to appeal to the US Supreme Court, 
which on 20 December decided the appeal was out of its jurisdiction, the seven defendants 
so sentenced were hanged at Sugamo Prison, with only military personnel and press present 
to verify, as MacArthur ordered.82 
Assessment 
Though the International Military Tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo ended at different 
times and in different settings, the immediate aftermaths were very similar. The sentencing 
and executions captured headlines, but the public soon lost interest since the Cold War 
quickly overshadowed the past with the possibility of another catastrophic war. Since war 
crimes trials were about satisfying legal principles as well as public opinion, smaller national 
trials for non-major war criminals followed the IMTs. 
During the Cold War's first decade, the ideals which provided the basis of the Nuremberg 
81 Minear, Victor's Justice, 32. The four justices excluded from the majority opinion's drafting and 
Jaranilla, who said some sentences were too lenient, submitted the opinions. 
82Horowitz, ''Tokyo Trial," 573. Brackman, Other Nuremberg, 369, 403. 
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and Tokyo IMTs fell by the wayside along with the organization also founded on those ideals, 
the Unit,ed Nations. In the 1960s, the UN experienced a renaissance with colonialism's end in 
most of Africa and Southeast Asia, and Adolf Eichmann's trial in Jerusalem renewed interest 
in the Holocaust and also Nuremberg. The Tokyo trial has enjoyed no such positive second 
look, though some scholars now see the transcripts as "an embarrassing judicial disaster but 
a goldmine of information."83 
After the USSR's collapse in 1991, the UN became a more viable player in international 
politics and in some ways took up the cause abandoned after Nuremberg. The recurrence 
of Crimes Against Humanity in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia led to the establishment 
of two International Criminal Tribunals on the Nuremberg model.84 Though they lack the 
benefits Allied hegemony gave the IMTs and have had less than spectacular success, the UN 
ICTs confirm the longterm I\ uremberg legacy. 
Comparing the International Military Tribunals 
The examination of the International Military Tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo reveals 
no obvious reason to compare them. The Nuremberg trial was far better covered in the press 
and had more famous defendants. Since then, scores of articles, books, and films have noted 
the wide importance of Nuremberg in realms such as politics, law, and morality. Predictably, 
Nuremberg is consistently the precedent cited, while few people remember that a trial of 
Japanese leaders even took place. 
The apparent strength of the Nuremberg IMT was colored by preconceptions about the 
Nazi defendants. Japanese defendants, "despite the grievous crimes of which they were 
accused . . . failed to exude the aura of evil personified that choked the courtroom where 
their 1'\azi counterparts were tried."85 Justice for Hitler's accomplices appeared to be an 
83R. John Pritchard, "What the Historian Can Find in the Proceedings of t,he International Military 
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extraordinary accomplishment-until the same trappings were fitted to a trial of imperialist 
leaders being charged, tried, and punished by their equally imperialist competitors. In other 
words, the ideas behind the Nuremberg trial need to be confirmed by the Tokyo proceedings. 
This imbalance is precisely why the IMTs should be compared and contrasted. They fea-
tured the same major powers- France, the UK, USA, and USSR- during the same postwar 
period. Comparing Nuremberg with Tokyo is in that way more significant than, for exam-
ple, comparing Nuremberg and the International Criminal Tribunals set up by the United 
Nations to judge the leaders of Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia for atrocities similar to 
those committed during World War II. Even if the trials' most important aspects are the 
similarities in their historical settings, certainly comparison should narrow down and perhaps 
reveal the reasons for their decidedly uneven legacies. 
The Allies encoura-ged such comparison and fully expected to be examined and hopefully 
justified by history. In his opening statement at Nuremberg, Justice Jackson stated, "vVe 
must never forget that the record on which we judge these defendants is the record on which 
history will judge us tomorrow."86 The Allies claimed to apply universal legal principles, ones 
that should hold true for all people in all places at all times. Reconciling the courtrooms at 
Nuremberg and Tokyo helps reveal the difference between principle and practice to borrow 
a phrase from a recent study, reveal 'l;he politics of war crimes trials."87 
Similarities 
It is no coincidence that the same leaders ensured that both the Nuremberg and Tokyo 
trials took place. This is a key similarity between the IMTs since other trials have failed 
without such executive support-for example, the post-World War I plan to try Kaiser 
Wilhelm II.88 The trial plan succeeded because President Truman gave the pro-trial group 
in vVashington a strong mandate to proceed. 89 The origins of the Tokyo trial were less direct 
86IMT, Trial, 2:100. 
87Gary Jonathan Bass, Stay the Hand of Vengeance: The Politics of War Crimes Trials {Princeton, NJ: 
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but also came from Washington.90 The heads of state during the IMTs- Atlee, Stalin. and 
Truman- did not direct the trials, but both were dependent on executive authority for their 
creation. 
Since the London Charter governed .:-.ruremberg and was copied for Tokyo, it reveals a 
great deal about the trials' successes and shortcomings. First, it provided all major judi-
cial aspects of the IMTs, including jurisdiction, rules and procedures. Second, the London 
Charter also extended the range of charges beyond traditional war crimes: Crimes Against 
Peace, Crimes Against Humanity, and the Anglo-American concept of conspiracy. Third, 
it secured the bench (and prosecution) for the victors only, an aspect of both trials which 
has been repeatedly criticized. While public opinion would not have stood for inclusion of 
even anti-Nazi German or anti-military Japanese justices, there was good reason for the 
prosecution to include representatives of the Polish government in exile, the Czech or Ko-
rean resistance, or perhaps even neutral nations. Lastly, though an original purpose of the 
non-traditional charges was to prosecute crimes of Germans against Germans (particularly 
Jews), neither tribunal prosecuted crimes of leaders against their own people. One Japanese 
researcher regards this as "one of [the IMTFE'sl greatest failings" that meant "the Japanese 
people were never informed" of many crimes the militarists committed against Japanese as 
well as their colonial subjects in Korea and Taiwan.91 Of course, it is important to remember 
the "conception [of the trials] during the war in an atmosphere of mutual hate."92 
The greatest impact of the London Charter's governance of jurisdiction, rules, and proce-
dures at both IMTs was the prosecutional bias built into the system. Theoretically, this was 
of little consequence since the prosecution teams should not have abused their many privi-
leges, but in practice abuses occurred at both trials. The most obvious was of documentary 
resources, which resulted in some absurd situations. For example, at the beginning of the 
Nuremberg case, 250 copies of documents were given to the press but only 5 to all defense 
90Piccagallo, Japanese on 1hal, 10. The Tokyo orders came from the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). 
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counsel, to whom the archives were closed.93 Witness testimony provides another example: 
at Tokyo, due to the impossibility of simultaneous translation, affidavits-prepared with 
prosecution help- were accepted in place of courtroom witness testimony. The defense was 
not permitted to have similar affidavit sessions with such witnesses, but had to call them to 
court to perform cross-examinations.94 
This is not to say that defendants were afforded no protections. Though the London 
Charter was designed to convict Nazi leaders, the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials were not 
show trials. The judges took their positions seriously, and never allowed the prosecution 
to control the courtroom. Several defendants, notably Goring and Tojo, had little hope of 
getting light sentences but understood the nature of the trial and made use of the platform 
their testimony provided. Others, such as Albert Speer, Germany's Armaments Minister, 
and Mamoru Shigemitsu, who had been a leader of the peace faction in Japan, were able to 
gain considerable mitigation. 
The precedent-setting charges are the basis of the legal importance of both trials, though 
especially Nuremberg. The IMTs would have had little significance in international law 
if they had been simply trials under well-established definitions of war crimes, or under 
domestic laws-as were held in Germany in the 1950-60s and were planned in occupied 
Japan but forbidden by SCAP.95 Instead, these were the first trials whose defendants were 
charged with beginning wars of aggression , as well as with the less controversial charge of 
Crimes Against Humanity. The nature of the charges led one participant in the Tokyo trial 
to declare its "great consequence to jurists and students of internationallaw."96 
D ifferences 
The Nuremberg and Tokyo trials did not take place simultaneously, only generally in 
93Taylor, Anatomy, 175, and Otto Kranzbuhler, "Challenge to the Nuremberg Procedures" in Marrus, 
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the same postwar period. Nuremberg was clearly the first; Supreme Court Justice Robert 
Jackson's April 1945 appointment as lJS Chief Prosecutor took place before Germany sur-
rendered. While the planning for the Nuremberg IMT was not completed at that time. that 
Thuman chose a member of the central judicial institution of the United States- when he 
could easily have assigned the task to some lesser civilian authority or the military- was not 
taken lightly. Jackson, who devoted his life to a career in a legal system that prided itself 
on justice, was a symbol of Anglo-American law, which "could not go along with pretended 
trials."97 
In contrast, Thuman waited to appoint Jackson's Far East counterpart until the end of 
1\ovember 1945, more than three months after the Pacific War ended. Even then he chose 
former Assistant Attorney General Joseph Keenan, who, though an excellent lawyer and 
organizer, had many ·shortcomings. Besides his noticeably lower rank, Keenan, who was 
a recovering alcoholic, moved in political instead of judicial circles, demonstrated lack of 
knowledge of Asian affairs, and had an abrasive personality that made him "often at the 
center of a storm."98 His first week in Tokyo he made a fool of himself by proposing that the 
major war criminals be tried under American law for starting wars in China and the Pacific 
"since the initial attack was against American territory at Pearl Harbor."99 
More mundane aspects of the justices' courtroom presence gave each courtroom a dif-
ferent feel. At the first IMT, voting judges and alternates both participated and their 
individual opinions and personalities emerged in the record. Due to the bench's larger size 
at the IMTFE, the justices decided that only President of the Thibunal William Webb would 
normally address the court, so only he had a microphone.100 The result was that everything 
coming from the judges was filtered through Webb's sometimes brusque personality, and 
transcripts reveal the Tokyo courtroom's more authoritarian setting. 
Broader regional affairs during the period differed completely. In Europe. most of the 
97 Jackson, quoted in Taylor, Anatomy, 46. 
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continent was returning to stability and beginning to rebuild. Tensions between the West 
and Soviet Union over the shape of postwar central and eastern Europe were t.he biggest 
worries. Most of East Asia, on the other hand, went from one war into another. In China, 
the civil war between Communists and Nationalists resumed after Japanese troops withdrew, 
and local nationalists in what would become Indonesia, Malaysia, and Vietnam fought the 
returning imperial powers. The Philippines and India pushed for the independence they 
had been promised, and Korea was divided between the United States and USSR, making 
occupied Japan virtually the only politically stable area in the whole region. 
While the Charters that ruled the IMTs were nearly identical, a different process produced 
each. After Jackson's appointment, the four victorious Great Powers- the UK, USA, USSR, 
and France-scheduled the International Conference on Military Trials (ICMT) in London 
to decide details. Each representative, whose positions held equal or superior status to 
Jackson's, had been granted executive authority to sign an agreement on behalf of his country. 
The resulting London Charter, a cooperative venture throughout, allowed for each signatory 
power to appoint a chief prosecutor for the trial. 
The Tokyo Charter reveals itself as an exclusive product of the US occupation simply by 
its formal name: SCAP Special Proclamation of 19 January 1946. Though it was a modestly 
edited copy of the London Charter, this editing was a unilateral project; SCAP and the Inter-
national Prosecution Section, which at the time included only Keenan and his appointments, 
controlled it completely. Though it allowed for more international representation nine na-
tions initially, with justices from India and the Philippines included later- the Tokyo Char-
ter allowed for only one Chief Prosecutor appointed by the American commander, General 
MacArthur. 
The charge of "a common plan or conspiracy" to commit aggressive war exposed this 
separate development. The initial reason the charge had been approved was that US leaders 
were convinced that a conspiracy, at least within the SS, existed. 101 In other words , it 
101 Smith, Road, 117. 
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wa.s ea.sy to imagine Adolf Hitler at the center of a conspiratorial group including Heinrich 
Rimmler, Hermann Goring, the Gestapo, and t,he SS. However, conspiracy was a crime 
defined only in Anglo-American common law, and wa.s a particularly hard sell for Jackson 
at the ICMT in London. To convince French representative Andre Gros of its necessity, 
he final1y resorted to naming a specific possible defendant, Hjalmar Schacht, who might be 
~onvicted only on that charge. Differences of opinion surfaced later as well. As the judges 
discussed sentencing, French justice Donnedieu de Vabres recommended that the conspiracy 
charge be thrown out, and though this wa.s rejected, only eight of the twenty-two defendants 
were convicted on the count. 102 After the trial, Henry Stimson stated, "If there is a weakness 
in the 'Iribunal 's findings, I believe it lies in its very limited construction of the legal concept 
of conspiracy."103 
The situation in Japan wa.s completely different. Japanese militarists had transformed 
the Emperor, Japan's only central figure, into a symbol of Japanese nationalism, but he 
was a timid private man- hardly a Hitler. There were no nat ional organizations :;imilar t,o 
the SS. Japanese leaders had never developed or adapted an ideology comparable to Kazism, 
though the native Shinto religion had been misused as a vehicle for nationalistic propaganda. 
Inclusion of conspiracy a.s a crime wa.s not a decision made by any international confer-
ence-only by Americans who were already familiar with the charge. This "gives a telling 
impression of the extent to which America could be driven by a respect for its own law .... The 
conspiracy charges worked particularly badly at the Tokyo trials."104 The prosecution had to 
define the conspiracy widely enough to catch in its net nearly every cabinet member of the 
Japanese government plus the highest military officers for the previous fifteen years. Almost 
anyone could have participated in such a common plan, and twenty-three of twenty-five 
defendants were convicted on that count. 
Another possible explanation for the immediate success of Tokyo's conspiracy charge-
102Taylor, Anatomy, 550. 
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and for its later infamy- lies with the judges who passed the verdicts. To spectators, the most 
obvious difference between the Nuremberg and Tokyo benches was the number of people: 
four versus eleven. At Nuremberg, two came from Anglo-American law practice, and two did 
not; at Tokyo, more than half were trained in Anglo-American law- the representatives of 
the US, UK, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, and India.105 At the Tokyo 
trial, a simple majority determined all judgments; at Nuremberg, with only four voting 
judges, a simple majority was also a two-thirds majority. ·while familiarity with the concept 
of conspiracy certainly does not equate to a vote for conviction, doubtless it neither hurt t he 
Anglo-American prosecutors' case nor helped the Japanese defense unfamiliar with it. 
There was also a clear conflict of interest, in some of the )i"uremberg participants. At, 
the ICMT, Justice Jackson and Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe had personally set t he jurisdiction 
of the court before which they were prosecuting. Presiding were fellow designers Robert 
Falco, French alternate judge, and General Nikitchenko, the sitting Soviet representative. 
Nikitchenko's position is especially troubling, since at the ICMT he expressed t.he opinion 
that they were "dealing here with the chief war criminals who have already been convicted 
and whose conviction has been already announced by both the Moscow and Crimea decla-
rations."106 
'l\vo representatives on the Tokyo bench had conflicting interests of a different sort. Jus-
tice Radhabinod Pal , an Indian nationalist, clearly sympathized with the Japanese posit.ion 
and may have decided to acquit the defendants before the trial began.107 Deflin Jaranilla 
of the Philippines had fought the Japanese as a volunteer and had been mistreated as a 
prisoner of war; his concurring opinion complained of the leniency of the sentencing. 
The prevalent imperialist attitudes and outright racism of the t ime must also be consid-
ered in thinking about the Tokyo trial. The amendment of the Tokyo Charter t.o include 
representatives from India and the Philippines only partially solved the problem of imperial 
105Brackman, Other Nuremberg, 69. 
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powers trying their Japanese competitors. As for racism, even General Douglas MacArthur, 
who later showed great respect for the Japane~e, was convinced early in the war that Euro-
pean mercenaries were flying enemy aircraft since Japanese racial features prevented them 
from being effective pilots.108 
Post-Trial Variances 
Since the trials, the Nuremberg record has been more widely available and much more 
studied. 109 The complete transcript of the Nuremberg trial, widely available today, was 
published immediately after the trial in forty-two volumes including index under the name 
Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 14 
November 1945- 1 October 1946. This availability, combined with its relatively easy use, 
must be considered as a major reason for the far greater amount of scholarly work on the 
. 
Nuremberg trial. 
As for Tokyo, "public indifference to the Tokyo Trial has been matched by an appar-
ent lack of interest on the part of the sponsoring governments themselves."110 No official 
collection of the Tokyo transcripts has ever been published. The first publication of even 
part of the Tokyo record was Justice Pal's dissenting opinion, which he published privately 
in India in 1953. The complete judgment, along with concurring and dissenting opinions, 
was edited and published in the 1\etherlands by Justice Roling in 1977. A private company 
finally published the complete transcripts in 1981-more than thirty years after the trial 
ended. 111 As for scholarship, the major English-language works on the Tokyo trial can be 
counted on one hand. Nuremberg has been remembered and praised, Tokyo forgotten. 
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Conclusion 
As the Allies developed a plan to deal with the leaders of occupied Germany, they did 
not have such luxuries as detailed studies of the Nazi regime, helpful summaries of available 
information, or even deadlines, since surrender could come at any moment. The Nuremberg 
trial's development included haphazard planning, logistical challenges, and fears that a trial 
would turn into a Nazi propaganda vehicle. The trial plan became official policy only after 
President Truman publicly appointed Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson as "chief of 
council" and Hitler's death was confirmed.112 
What made this last-minute trial develop into a landmark of international law? Its 
importance stems from decisions made at the International Conference on Military Trials 
(IC:MT), which met in London in the summer of 1945. The resultant Charter of the Inter-
. 
national Military Tribunal (IMT) first defined as criminal such actions as concpiracy and 
aggressive war. The major goal was not simply to punish the guilty-other means could 
have quickly and easily done so. Instead, the Allies had a much grander aim: in the words of 
Justice Jackson's opening address, "to utilize international law to meet the greatest menace 
of our times-aggressive war."113 While Jackson gave the most idealistic speech, all four 
head counsels at Nuremberg highlighted this goal. 114 The aggressive war charge culminated 
a decades-long attempt to expand the scope of war crimes beyond violations of the Hague 
and Geneva Conventions. 
The IMT was not perfect. The conspiracy charge probably should have been dropped 
since it "unnecessarily complicated the trial and failed to serve the purpose for which it was 
intended."115 Likewise, the prosecution of organizations in addition to individuals accom-
plished little since de-Nazification laws met the same goals. Creators of the London Charter 
were present both in the prosecution, which abused its privileges, and on the bench, which 
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disallowed embarrassing comparisons to Allied actions such as the Soviet invasion of Poland. 
However, the Allies demonstrated their commitment to predefined law. The prosecution 
explicitly opened its case to future criticism as well as defense rebuttal. Unlike the outgoing 
Axis regimes, the Allies were willing to admit that they might be wrong, which helps explain 
continuing interest in Nuremberg despite its shortcomings and failure as a deterrent. \h/hile 
the prosecution dominated the defense, the justices controlled the courtroom and refused 
to compromise justice. The unanimous judgment dealt harshly with the guilty-delivering 
twelve death sentences and three for life imprisonment-but also acquitted three defendants. 
Between the Nuremberg trial's beginning and judgment, a similar effort began for the 
wartime leaders of Japan. On paper, the two trials were remarkably similar. Both IMTs took 
place in the same postwar era, under basically the same rules and principles, and claimed to 
harbinger a new responsibility in international relations. Each trial punished high-ranking 
Axis leaders for heinous crimes, though courts-martial might have accomplished this with 
less time and effort. Each also successfully revealed a great deal of information, including 
otherwise inaccessible witness testimony, about t he character of the regimes that had been 
in power in Germany and Japan. 
In reality, while the Nuremberg trial was developed cooperatively and took place in a 
relatively stable Europe, the International Military Thibunal for the Far East (IMTFE) was 
dominated by the United States, received little attention from governments or the press, 
and took place while much of East Asia was in revolution or civil war. At the same time as 
the Western powers tried Japanese leaders for attempting to conquer East Asia, they were 
forcibly reimposing their will in places like the Dutch East Indies and French Indochina. 
While the Tokyo trial had greater international representation, the United States wielded 
far greater control than any nation had done at Nuremberg. This was a product of the Pacific 
\Var, in which United States troops had done most of the fighting, and the occupation of 
Japan, which was not divided up like Germany. 
At the IMTFE, seventeen of the twenty-six defendants were high-ranking military officers, 
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reflecting military control of the Japanese government. MacArthur, with t he prosecution 's 
cooperation, protected the Emperor from prosecution, though his Lord Keeper of the Privy 
Seal, Marquis Koichi Kido, was tried as a proxy of sorts. The prosecution used Kido's 
extensive diary as a guide to investigation, which raises questions about the validity of using 
one defendant's opinions against others. The Tokyo proceedings revealed more intrigue 
and divergent goals among the accused than those at Nuremberg. The military defendants 
argued that Japan was fighting a war of economic self-defense. These arguments, the same 
that Japan had used before and during the war, were unlikely to convince Allied judges of 
their innocence. 
The lack of screening for the Tokyo 'Iribunal's judges has been its most criticized as-
pect. 116 Several justices had prominent shortcomings or conflicts of interest . .\1ore than half 
had a background in ·Anglo-American law, which was not practiced in Japan and therefore 
was unfamiliar to the defendants. The Tokyo Judgment , supplemented by three full and two 
partial dissents , delivered seven death sentences, ten life imprisonments, and no acquittals. 
The most surprising sentence was hanging for former Prime Minister Hirota , who had no 
direct connection to atrocities. Though all the justices except Pal signed a secrecy agreement, 
from the information in dissenting opinions and his own recollection Justice ROling later 
concluded that Hirota had been sentenced to death on a 6-5 vote.U7 The bench also fo und 
all but two defendants guilty of a conspiracy to commit aggressive war; at 1'\uremberg, 
only eight of twenty-two were convicted on that charge. The IMTFE's decisions were not 
unanimous; in t heir later published opinions, Justice Pal and President Webb objected to 
the conspiracy charge, Webb calling it "nothing less than judiciallegislation." 118 
Vlhy is the International Military 'fribunal today considered a landmark of international 
law in contrast to its counterpart in the Far East? The Nuremberg trial's positive legacy is 
easier to explain than t he Tokyo trial's negat.ive one. Despite its shortcomings, the Nurem-
116See, for example, Minear, Victor's Justice, 75-92. 
117Dower, Embracing Defeat, 628 n.29. 
118\Villiam Webb, "Separate Opinion" in Roling and Ruter, Tokyo Judgement, 1:475. Quoted in Minear, 
Victor's Just,ce, 42, and Dower , Embracing Defeat, 463. 
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berg trial had truly impressive results. For the first time, victorious powers were willing to 
let international law- albeit a form dictated by the winners-decide the fate of their foes. 
At Tokyo, however, discrepancies between the European and Pacific situations became 
apparent. The Pacific War had been no just war, as was clear to both the Japanese defendants 
and their judges. While Japanese troops committed worse crimes, the Allies were imperialist 
powers guilty of many of the same crimes- mistreatment of enemy soldiers and civilians, 
abusing native peoples, and attacking other countries aggressively-as the Japanese. The 
Nuremberg trial had emphasized that the Allies were different; the Tokyo highlighted the 
Allies' shortcomings. 
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